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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case: The PlaintifIIAppellant, Pedro Pelayo (herein after Plaintiff or Pedro),
set forth the nature of the case and it will not be repeated here. In short, the case is a Divorce
proceeding with issues of property division, child custody, child support, maintenance, and
adultery.

11.

Course of Proceedings: The Plaintiff has set forth the course of the proceedings and they
will not be restated here. The Respondent, Bertha Pelayo (herein after Respondent or
Bertha), does note that there are several aspects of the Plaintiff's summary oflhe arguments
and evidence that arc disputed, but will deal with those in the body of her Brief

111.

Statement of Facts: Although the Plaintiffhas set forth the basic facts, there are some which
he has misstated, some which he has ignored, and there are several which the Respondent
feels are necessary to set forth. The Parties were married for a total of a little over 25 years
at the time the Plaintiff filed for Divorce on June 18, 2009. By the time the Decree of
Divorce was entered on May 18, 2010, the Parties had been married a little over 26 years.
During the vast majority of that time Bertha did not work outside the home, but was a stay
at home mother. Although he denied it even

In

the face of overwhelming evidence, the

Plaintiffhad an affair. It is a fact that his Complaint for Divorce claimed he should be given
the debt-free property on the Fort Hall Reservation and Bertha should be given the only
property that had debt associated with it, a debt which she could not service. It is a fact that
his Complaint for Divorce stated that the Parties had equal custody oftheir minor son when,
in fact, the son wanted nothing to do with the Plaintiff. It is a fact that his Complaint for
Divorce stated that he should only pay child support in the amount of$150.00 dollars, when

the absolute minimum he should pay, even construing all the evidence and arguments in his
favor, is more than $450.00 a month. It is a fact that his Complaint for Divorce states that
each party should be awarded their own retirement accounts when he knew that he had
approximately $20,000.00 in his retirement and Bertha did not even have a retirement
account. It is a fact that he forged Bertha's signature on their tax return and listed his
Pocatello address for the refund to go to. It is a fact that he testified that he should get all of
the refund and then said Bertha could have a 1/3 of it before his attorney talked to him and
he finally relented that she could have half of the refund. It is a fact that he has cared about
nobody during this entire ordeal except himself. Specific references vvill be made in the body
of this Brief
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ISSUES/ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Bertha, will restate the issues on appeal to more accurately reflect the law and the facts of the
case and includes the additional Issue of her attorney fees on appeal.

ISSUE I,

THE AWARDING OF SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW

ISSUE II:

THE A WARD OF CHILD SUPPORT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
THELA\V.

ISSUEIII:

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYFEESIS SlJPPORTEDBYTHEEVIDENCE AND
THE LAW.

ISSUE IV:

THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL.

ISSUE V:

BERTHA SHOULD BE A WARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

3

AHCUMENTS ON API>EAL

ISSUE I:

THE AWARDING OF SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although the Plaintiff citesllentges v Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 765 P.2d 1094(Ct.App.1988),
for the standard of review on appeal by his Brief quickly gives way to suggesting that there is some
confusion as to that Standard. At the outset then it is important to establish the standard for review
on this appeal.
In Stewart v Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 667, 152 P.3d 544,548(2007) the Court held that
"Regarding spousal maintenance, this Court reviews the trial court's findings "that are the
basis for the court's decision as to the duration and the amount of spousal maintenance to
determine whether there exists substantial and competent evidence in support of these
findings." Chandler, 136 Idaho at 249,32 P.3d at 143 (citing Wilson v Wilson, 131 Idaho
533,535,960 P.2d 1262, 1264 (1998); Mulch v Mulch, 125 Idaho 93,98,867 P.2d 967, 972
(1994)). "The allowance of alimony and the amount thereof, are in the first instance
committed to the trial court's discretion." Nielsen v Nielsen, 871daho 578,585,394 P.2d 625,
629 (1964)."
The Plaintiff suggests that there is a double standard or some confusion in this regard and perhaps
one standard for the decision as to whether to grant spousal maintenance and another standard for
how much it should be and for how long it should be awarded. The Plaintiff cites Mulch v Mulch,
125, Idaho 93, 867 P.2d 967 (1994) and indicates that they are somehow inconsistent and that Mulch
should control.
The Defendant does not see any inconsistencies and believes Stewart sets forth the correct
standard for review. Stewart clearly states, supra at Idaho p. 667, that "The allowance of alimony
and the amount thereof, are in the first instance committed to the trial court's discretion." Nielsen v
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Nielsen, 87 Idaho 578,585,394 P.2d 625, 629 (1964)." It doesn't get much clearer than that. Of
course a Trial Court's discretion is not unfettered and must be based on evidence. In that regard, the
Courts have routinely held, as quoted from Stewart above, that there must be substantial and
competent evidence to support the Trial Court's findings. So, the standard is a clear abuse of
discretion standard and as long as there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
Magistrate's decision, it must be upheld.
The Stewart Court further delineated the method for review of the Trial Court by noting, ibid,
that:
"Review of a lower court's exercise of discretion is conducted under a three-tiered inquiry:
"(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. " Chandler, 136 Idaho at 249,32 P.3d at 143 (citing State v Hedger, 115
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)); Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v Idaho
Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)."
In Hentges, supra at Idaho 194, the Court of Appeals noted that:

"Where a district court sits as an appellate court for the purpose of reviewing a magistrate's
judgment, the district court is required to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support
the magistrate's findings of fact. If those findings are so supported, and if the conclusions of law
demonstrate proper application of legal principles to the facts found, then the district eourt will
affirm the magistrate's judgment. The judgment also will be upheld on further appeal. See Ustick v
Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct.App.1983)."
In Shepard v Shepard, 94 Idaho 734, 735,497 P.2d 321,322 (Idaho 1972), the Court noted that:
"As stated in Brammer v Brammer, 93 Idaho 671,674,471 P.2d 58, at 61 (1970):
'It has long been the rule of this Court that where there is sufficient substantial and competent
evidence to support the findings of the trial court and such findings are not clearly against the weight
of the evidence, the findings are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed on appeal.
Howay v Howay, 74 Idaho 492,264 P.2d 691 (1953). The trial judge is the arbiter of conflicting
evidence and his determination of the weight, credibility, inferences and implications thereof is no
to be supplanted by this Court's impressions or conclusions from the written record. Sellars v Sellars,
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73 Idaho 163, 248 P .2d 1063 (1952); Piatt v Piatt, 32 Idaho 407, 184 P. 470 (1919). This is so
because the trial court has a better opportunity to judge this matter because of seeing and noting the
demeanor of the witnesses. Keezer on the Law of Marriage & Divorce, § 881, p. 877 (3d ed. 1946),'
Finally, as the Court stated in Robinson v Robinson, 136 Idaho 451, 453, 35 PJd 258,
260(2001):
"When the trial court sat without ajury, we liberally construe the trial court's findings offact in favor
of the judgment entered. See Ervin Cons/r. Co., 125 Idaho at 699, 874 P.2d at 510 (quoting Sun
Val1ey Shamrock Resources, Inc. v Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389,
1391 (1990)). Even if there exists conflicting evidence, we will not disturb the trial court's findings
and conclusions on appeal if they are based on substantial evidence. See id."
As will be shown below, although there is conflicting evidence, there is substantial evidence to
support the Decision of the Magistrate below, paliicularly when the findings of fact are construed
in favor of the judgment entered. The recitation of facts sel forth in the Plaintiff's Brief before this
Court actually sets forth the conflicting evidence and demonstrates that there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the Decision of the Magistrate.
MAINTENANCE
The Plaintiff first suggests that the award of Maintenance

III

this case amounts to a

"permanent maintenance, which is disfavored." Appellant's Brief on Appeal, page 21. The
Defendant will not respond to this, other than to say it is incorrect, because there is nothing in the
record or in the law to suggest that paying maintenance until a party is in their sixties amounts to
permanent maintenance. The Plaintiff cites no authority for this position.
The Plaintiff then contends that the awarding of spousal support was invalid for three
reasons. Each will be discussed in turn.
First, the Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in relying on adultery to award Bertha
Maintenance. This is an invalid argument for two reasons.

6

First, there is no case law, and the Plaintiff has cited the Court to none, either in this
jurisdiction or elsewhere, that establishes that just because a Court grants a divorce on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences it cannot consider fault, including adultery, in the awarding of
maintenance. In other words, the grounds for a divorce is left to the sound discretion of the
Magistrate.) There is absolutely no reason a Magistrate cannot enter a divorce on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences, but still find fault with either, or both parties, just as the Magistrate below
did. The Plaintiff cites Idaho Code § 32-603 in support of the proposition that the Court cannot
consider fault in making an award of maintenance unless it is proven according to thc applicable
evidentiary standard. Page 26 of Plaintiff s Brief on Appeal. However, said Code Section simply
lists the different grounds for Divorce and does not set forth the evidentiary standard for any ofthe
grounds and thus does not support the Plaintiffs position. The Plaintiffs contention that the
Magistrate's ruling below will "open the flood gates to litigants who will clog up the

COurtS,,2

is

simply not supported by the record or the law.] The Plaintiff contends that this Court should revisit
the previous cases which allow the Magistrate to do what he did, because "divorce litigants should
have to make a choice as to whether they will pursue a divorce based on fault or 'no fault.. ...... ' The
Defendant is trying to playa shell game with this argument since she did make an choice. The
Plaintiff committed adultery and she decided to Counter-Claim on those grounds and pursue those

ISee Generally: Jordan v Jordan, 75 Idaho 512, 275 P.2d 669(1954), holding that a finding of
divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty will not be set aside absence a showing of abuse of discretion.
2Plaintiffs Brief on Appeal, page 27.
3In point of fact, Neveau, v Neveau, 103 Idaho 707, 652 P .2d 655 (Idaho App. 1982), discussed
more fully, infra, has been the law since ]982 and has not "opened the flood gates."
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grounds. The issue is not what did the Defendant do or what might parties do in the future, the issue
is whether the decision of the Magistrate is support by the law and the facts, which it is.
The Plaintiff also contends that "there is one and only one reason for a divorce litigant to try
to prove fault of the other party and that reason is to obtain spousal support or an unequal division
of community property." Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal, page 23. Bertha can think of at least one other
reason: Because the Plaintiff has committed adulterj Because it is important to her that people
knovv' that he committed adultery an.d walked out on his family. That, m and of itself, says something
about the Plaintiff and his trustworthiness and his commitment to the sanctity of marriage, which the
State ofIdaho takes very seriously. In at least one case, this Court has found that the actions of one
party in committing adultery has an impact on the family unit and can be considered by the trial court
in determining that the party committing adultery should not be given primary physical custody of
the minor children even if the evidence shows both parties are otherwise fit parents. Gustaves v

Gustave, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775(2002).
Second, there is nothing in the law or in Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(g) that says the "fault" in
that section must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Plaintiff cites this Court to

Bramer v Bramer, 93 Idaho 671,471 P .2d 58(1970) for the proposition that Adultery must be proven
by "clear and conclusive" evidence. However, that case, and those cited in Bramer, supra, are all
cases which deal with the granting of divorce on the grounds of Adultery, not the granting of
maintenance on the grounds of the fault of a parties. The Magistrate below never made a specific
finding, one way or the other, as to whether Adultery had been shown by clear and convincing
evidence, choosing instead to enter the divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. In this,
it must be remembered that although the Plaintiff tried to get out during the testimony that no one
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had actually seen the Plainti1I engage in sexual intercourse, such direct evidence is not necessary
since the same can be proven by circumstantial evidence and Bertha has done that in this case. See:

Neveau v Neveau, 103 Idaho 707, 652 P.2d 655 (Idaho App. 1982), holding that evidence adduced
at trial and not objected to may be used by the Court for its Decree, even if not plead, and that clear
and convincing evidence is not needed when considering Adultery in relation to an award of
maintenance. It is also interesting to note that the Court in Neveau, supra at Idaho 712, noted "that
'clear and conclusive' evidence of adultery is necessary in order to ascertain what particular conduct
has been put at issue ... " and not necessarily to thc actual proof of adultery. Even if the standard is
"clear and conclusive evidence" to prove Adultery as grounds for divorce, there is no case which
establishes that it has to be proven by direct evidence and cannot be proven by circumstantial
evidence and Neveau establishes that "clear and conclusive" is not the standard used in determining
maintenance.
Third, Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(g) talks about fault, not just adultery. The Magistrate found
"fault" on both sides in this matter 4, in the nature of cruel behavior one to the other, but found more
"fault" on the part of the Plaintiff .or, rather, more innocence on the part of Bertha. Tr. p. 456, Lt.
2-8. Certainly there is substantial and competent evidence to support this finding by the Magistrate.
Fourth, fault is just one of seven listed factors the Court may consider in awarding
maintenance and those listed factors are not exclusive. In fact the Statute speci fically states that the

4Indeed, during argument on the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, Counsel for the Plaintiff stated
that "The Court says it suspects adultery, but that the evidence was that neither party had been very kind
to each other. So the way I interpret that is there was fault going both ways. And, again, I wasn't at trial;
but, you know, that's my understanding." Tr. p. 433, LL. 8-13.
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Court should consider "all relevant factors which may include: ... " Idaho Code § 32-705(2).
(Emphasis Added). Thus, even if Adultery was not proven, even if fault was not proven, and even
if the Magistrate should not have relied on either relative to awarding maintenance, the award can
still be upheld since fault is not a required finding in order to award maintenance and, in fact, the
Magistrate did consider the other factors listed in Idaho Code § 32-705(2) and the equities of the
case. The Magistrate was in a unique position to judge the parties and the witnesses and ma!(e a
determination as to such an award and it should not be displaced on appeaL In this, it must be
remembered that even ift.~e Magistrate below made an error oflaw in reaching his Decision, such
Decision will still be upheld if it can be supportd on other grounds. In lo'wing v Department of
Transportation, 147 Idaho 305,208 PJd 287(2009), the Idaho Supreme Court held that "Where an

order of a lower court is correct, but based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon
the correct theory. Athay v Stacey, 146 Idaho 407,415, 196 P.3d 325, 333 (2008)." See also:
McColm-Traska v Baker, 139 Idaho 948,88 PJd 767(2004).
The evidence in this case did show that Bertha made around 17 or 18 thousand dollars during
one year, approximately 4 years ago, when she was in her early 40's. It also showed that she made
significantly less than that in all the other years, most years not making anything. It also
demonstrated that she was not working outside the home when the Plaintiff decided to have an affair
and end the marriage and she had not been working outside the home for more than six months prior
to the Plaintiff filing. In point of fact, it had been approximately 4 years since she had worked
outside the home.

10

The awarding of maintenance is lef-t to the sound discretion of the trial court. In Stewart ,
supra at Idaho 677, the Court held, in upholding an award of maintenance for 12 years on a 22 year
malTiage, that:
" Under I.e. § 32-705(1), the trial court may grant support where the spouse seeking the
award has shown that he or she (a) lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable
needs; and (b) is unable to support himself or herself through employment. "Reasonable needs,"
under Idaho law, account for the standard of living established during the marriage. Wilson ,
131 Idaho at 536, 960 P.2d at 1265. Regarding the duration of the award, I.C . § 32-705(2) lists
criteria for the court to consider, including the duration of the marriage; the age, physical condition,
resources, and employability of the spouse seeking the award; the ability of the spouse from whom
the award is sought to provide it; the fault of either party ; and any tax consequences . The magistrate
judge's findings reflect his reliance on these legal principles.
This Court "do[es] not expect mathematical precision in calculating to the dollar how much
maintenance is required, nor must the record support a specific amount." Wilson, 131 Idaho at 536,
960 P .2d at 1265 . The award must, however, be supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Reed, 137 Idaho at 56, 44 P.3d at 1111 . There is sufficient evidence to support the spousal
maintenance award of $5, 166.00 per month for twelve years." (Emphasis added).
Likewise, In Wilson v Wilson, 131 Idaho 533 ,534,960 P.2d 1262, 1263 (1998) (upholding
an eleven-year spousal support award for a marriage that lasted about 22 years, a case which is very
similar, in many respects, to the instant case in that:

"During the first fourteen years of the marriage, William attended medical school and received the
training necessary to become a plastic surgeon. In 1989, after William completed his medical
training, William and Frosty moved to Idaho Falls where William established a medical practice.
Although Frosty occasionally worked outside the home while William was in school, throughout
most of their marriage, she stayed home and raised their two children. William filed for a divorce
in 1995 on the grounds of ilTeconcilable differences. Frosty filed a counterclaim, seeking a divorce
on the grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty.1n addition, Frosty sought spousal maintenance for
a period of not less than twenty-two years." (Emphasis added).
The Court in Wilson, supra at Idaho p. 536, went into detail in explaining the upholding of both the
duration and the amounts of the maintenance:
"The magistrate judge awarded Frosty spousal maintenance for a total period of eleven years.
Pursuant to the award, William is to pay Frosty maintenance in the amount of$7,500 per month for
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six years, and thereafter, $6,500 per month for five years. William does not contest that Frosty is
entitled to an award of spousal maintenance. Rather, Wi Iliam argues that there is not substantial and
competent evidence in the record to support the magistrate judge's findings as to the duration and
the amount of the spousal maintenance award.
After a divorce is decreed, a court may grant a spouse an award of maintenance if the spouse:
(J) lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs, and (2) is unable to support
himself or herself through employment. I.e. § 32-705( 1). The court's award of maintenance should
be in an amount and for a duration that the court deems just after considering all relevant factors,
which may include:
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, including the marital property
apportioned to said spouse, and said spouse's ability to meet his or her needs independently;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enabie the spouse seeking
maintenance to find employment;
(c) The duration of the marriage;
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
(e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance;
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse;
(g) The fault of either party.
I.e. § 32-705(2). When determining a spouse's "reasonable needs," the court is to take into account
the standard of living established during the marriage. Campbell v Campbell, 120 Idaho 394, 404,
816 P.2d 350,360 (CLApp. 1991) (citations omitted).
In calculating Frosty'S spousal maintenance award, the magistrate judge made referencc to I.e
§ 32-705, and discussed in detail the factors he considered in determining the duration and the
amount of the award. Although the magistrate judge did not explain how he reached the specific
figures for the amount and the duration of the award, the judge did provide sui1icient findings to
indicate a basis for those decisions. Further, the cases in Idaho indicate that we may disregard the
trial court's failure to state specific reasons in support of its decision as to the amount and the
duration ofa spousal maintenance award, if the reasons are clear from a reading of the record.
With respect to the duration of the spousal maintenance award, the record reveals that Frosty's
education and skills are minimal, and she would like to obtain an architectural degree. The record
also contains evidence that Frosty is not in a position emotionally to begin work or school
immediately. Although the record does not contain specific evidence as to how long it will take
Frosty to obtain her degree, there is evidence that even once Frosty begins her education, she will
not be able to attend school full-time for several years because she needs to care for the two children.
We find that the record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's
finding that William should pay Frosty spousal maintenance for a period of eleven years.
With respect to the amount of the spousal maintenance award, the record contains only a
summary from Frosty of her reasonable and necessary monthly expenses, along with her testimony
explaining it. It is largely uncontroverted that Frosty'smonthly expenses total over $9,000 per month.
William argues on appeal that there is no basis for some of the expenses, that they are exaggerated
and that they are already paid by the child support payments he is making. Despite William's
disagreement with Frosty's expenses, there is nevertheless, substantial and competent evidence to
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support those expenses, and that she is unable to pay those expenses without substantial assistance
from William. William also argues that expenses for tithing and savings should not be included. The
magistrate judge specifically said he was not including those items in determining the proper amount
of maintenance. We do not expect mathematical precision in calculating to the dollar how much
maintenance is required, nor must the record support a specific amount. There must simply be
substantial and competent evidence which provides a basis for the amount awarded. We find the
record supports the award in this case in the amounts of$7,500 and $6,500.
In conclusion, even though the magistrate judge did not specify how he calculated the duration
and the amount of Frosty's spousal maintenance award, we affirm the magistrate judge's decision
because the record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's
findings as to the duration and the amount of the award." (Emphasis added).

In the instant case, although we are not talking about the same income capabilities as the
Court was dealing with in Wilson, we are dealing with the same issues: a wife who supportcd her
husband and allowed him to advance in his work to the point that he was making substantially more
than she could ever hope to make. A wife who stayed in the home and took care of the children. She
worked outside the home, but only sporadically. A wife who would not be able to support herself
in the manner she had become accustom to during the marriage. A wife who would need substantial
education. A wife who was emotionally not ready to try and go back to work or schooL
In analyzing the factors for whether maintenance should be awarded, it must be remembered
that the evidence showed the following under Idaho Code § 32-705, to wit:
As to whether Bertha lacks suf1icient property to provide for her reasonable needs under
Idaho Code § 32-705( 1)(a), the evidence showed that Bertha will not have enough from the sale of
all the property to provide for her needs according to the standard of living established during the
marriage. She may have enough for a down payment on a small house, but not much more. The
Plaintiff contends on pages 29 and 30 of his Brief on Appeal that with the money Bertha would get
from the sale of the Airport Road property and her portion of the Fort Hall property and selling the
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property in Mexico, she could "easily secure" a new plaee to live. Of course, she "only needs
enough room for herself' so the place could be small. All this, while the Plaintiff gets to stay in his
house with 15 acres with his new girlfriend. This is also disingenuous, as most of Plaintiffs
agreements have been throughout these proceedings, since the Plaintiff himself, on page 30 of his
Brief on Appeal notes that the asking price on the house has been dropped to $130,000.00 and still
has not sold.
As to whether Bertha is unable to support herself through employment under Idaho Code § 32705 (1 )(b), the evidence showed that while Bertha has worked outside the home on several occasions
doing menial jobs, the vast majority of her time has been in the home taking care of the Plaintiff,
their children, and the grandchildren. She was 48 years old at the time of trial, turned 49 in May of
2010, shortly after the trial, and is now 51 years old. She has no education and does not speak
English. The jobs she has done in the past will get more and more difficult as she gets older and the
evidenee clearly demonstrated, from the Plaintiffs own witness, that she cannot move very far up
in the companies unless she speaks and understands English, like the Plaintiff does.
As to the financial resources of Bertha, as the spouse seeking maintenance under Idaho Code

§ 32-705(2)(a) and her ability to meet her needs, as indicated above, Bertha will not be able to meet
her basic needs as established during the marriage without alimony from the Plaintiff.
As to the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable Bertha to find
employment, the evidence is clear that, at almost 49 years of age at the time of trial, Bertha's options
were, and are, very limited. It is important to remember that the Memorandum Decision of the
Magistrate below indicated not that Bertha does not need to work, as the Plaintiff contends, but
specifically found that she needs to work and that the award of maintenance, which was significantly
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less than Bertha was requesting, was based on the assumption that she would be working. s While
the Magistrate did not specifY every factor he was relying on for the amount and duration of the
award, the record supports a multitude of factors, such as going back to school to learn English so
she could perhaps get a better job.
As to the duration of the marriage as set forth in Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(c), the record reflects
that Bertha did her best to make a good home for the parties and raise their children for
approximately 26 years. The Plaintiff married her fairly young and took her to a strange country and
kept her isolated in their home. It should be noted that the Court in Srewarr, supra, actually awarded
support for a period which was approximately 55% of the length of the marriage when it awarded
maintenance for 12 years on a 22 year marriage. If the same factors are applied to this case, the
Court should have Ordered maintenance for 14.3 years. Wilson, supra awarded for a period that was
50% of the length of the marriage, which would be 13 years here. It should be noted here that the
Plaintiff contends in his Brief on Appeal, that the Magistrate awarded support for a total of 13 years. 6
In point of fact, the award did not begin until July 1,2010, when Bertha was already two months into
being 49 years of age, and will terminate upon her 62 nd birthday, approximately 12 years and 10
months after it started. 7

5 On page 5 of its Memorandum Decision, the Court specifically finds that: "In applying the
factors set forth in Idaho Code §32-70S, the court finds that Bertha lacks sufficient income to support
herself, even with full-time employment available her."
6Page

31 of said Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal.

7The Court, on page 6 of its Memorandum Decision, hold that: "Accordingly, this court orders
that Pedro pay to Bertha monthly spousal maintenance in the amount of $800.00 commencing July 1,
2010 for a period of seven (7) years, then reducing to the amount of 400.00 per month until Bertha's age
62. This spousal support award will terminate upon the death of either party or Bertha's remarriage. This
award makes an assumption that Bertha will be required to obtain and maintain her own health
insurance."
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As to the age and physical and emotional condition of Bertha, the spouse seeking
maintenance under Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(d), the record reflects that Bertha was 48 years old when
the award would begin, has been devastated by not only the abandonment by the Plaintiff, but also
him having an affair with another woman while still married to Bertha, and has had to deal with the
children's emotion distress as well, which Bertha has bcen left to deal with. Basically, the only work
she has done outside the home was manual labor, which will get more and mon; difficult as she gets
older. Here again is an excellent example of why these decisions are left to the discretion of the Trial
Court. The Magistrate was in a position to see and hear the parties and the witnesses. He was in a
position to assess the parties and their needs and emotional state of mind , things that are 110t, and can
not, be shown on a cold record on appeaL
As to the ability of the Plaintiff to meet his needs while meeting those of Bertha under Idaho
Code § 32-705(2)(e), the record reflects that the Plaintiff makes almost $50,000.00 a year[$4,200.00
a month], and will continue to have a good income and a good salary and will be more than able to
meet his needs and still pay maintenance to Bertha. Under the original Decree the Plaintiff was
Ordered to pay $558.00 a month tor child support for 12 months.' That support obligation is now
paid in full, so the Plaintiff has an extra $558.00 a month to help meet his needs. He certainly has
the ability to pay the $800.00 a month in maintenance which he has been paying.
As to the tax consequences to each party under Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(f), the record does
not reflect whether the Trial Court took that into consideration, but evidence as to the income of each
party which is on the record would certainly substantiate that there would be a tax benefit to the

8See page 4 of the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision, supra, and paragraph 3 of the
Decree of Divorce.
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Plaintiff, since he would not pay taxes on the money he paid for maintenance, and there would be
a tax benefit to Bertha in that she would not be paying taxes on the maintenance because of her lower
income level. There certainly is no evidence in the record that there would be any negative
consequences for either party.
This leaves the fault of either party pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-705(2)(g), which has been
discussed at length above. As demonstrated here, however, even iflhis Court were to take fault out
of the equation, the Judgement of the Magistrate can, and :-:hould, still be upheld on the other grounds
supported in the record.
It should also be noted that Bertha does not need to liquidate all of her assets and deplete her
retirement in order to get into a smaller house as the Plaintiff suggests on pages 29, 30 and 31 of his
Brief on Appeal. In Stewart, supra at P.3d p. 550, this Court address exactly this issue when it held
that:
"The community property awarded to Sally does not render the amount of spousal support
excessive. In Hoskinson v Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 80 P.3d 1049 (2003), we concluded that a
magistrate judge did not err in denying maintenance to a 39-year-old wife in good health after a three
year marriage, expecting her instead to meet her monthly expenses through a combination of
employment, her share of her husband's retirement plan, and the equity in her house. ld. at 463,80
P.3d at 1064. Notwithstanding our decision in Hoskinson, there is no requirement under Idaho law
that a spouse fully exhaust all assets before an award of maintenance is appropriate. Sally's portion
of the community property includes the value of the family's residence at $360,000.00 with a net
equity value of$141 ,300.00. To convert her community property award into expendable assets, Sally
would of course have to sell her house, which would in tum require her to purchase a new one.
While the purchase of a much more modest home would allow Sally to capture the excess value from
the sale of the family residence, the assumption that she must do so is inconsistent with providing
Sally her reasonable needs as defined by the standard of living established during the marriage. It
was reasonable for the magistrate judge to conclude that Sally should not have to relocate to a
significantly less expensive house and make early, penalized withdrawals from her retirement
accounts in order to maintain her standard of living.
The award of $5,166.00 for twelve years covers Sally'S expenses for the twelve years before
she is eligible for Social Security and can access her retirement accounts. After [152 P.3d 552] that,
Sally may support herself with her retirement accounts and any other assets she chooses to expend.
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The record supports the magistrate judge's findings that Sally lacks sufficient property to maintain
her current standard of living and that she is unable to adequately support herself though
employment. We conclude that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in setting the
amount and duration of the spousal support award." (Emphasis added).

Likewise in the instant matter, Bertha should not be required to lower her standard ofliving
while the Plaintiff runs off with another woman without a care in the world, leaving Bertha to tend
to the family. The Court awarded Bertha maintenance to help bridge the gap until she reaches
retirement age. Even then, as now, thc Plaintiff will be much better off than Bertha.
It must also be remembered that the District Court on Appeal below reversed the Magistrate

as to the awarding of the property in Mexico solely to the Defendant, so now the Plaintiff has more
property and the Defendant has less.
The Plaintiff next tries to argue that the award of maintenance is punitive rather than
rehabilitative. This argument must also fail for several reasons.
First, just because the Magistrate talks about the fault of the Plaintiff does not mean that the
award in "punitive." As discussed above, fault is one of the factors the Idaho Legislature has
indicated the Court should look at in determining maintenance. The Magistrate below was very clear
that he was awarding maintenance to help Bertha "fill that gap,,,9 "remedy the cash flow problem
which Bertha faces ... "10 The Court specifically denied the awarding of permanent maintenance on
page 5 of its Memorandum Decision, supra, and cited Tisdale v Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,333,900
P.2d 807, 809 (Ct.App.1995), which the Plaintiff now cites as authority for the proposition that the
Magistrate actually awarded permanent maintenance, which he did not.

9Tr. p. 466, L. 19 and Memorandum Decision, supra, page 6.
'OMemorandum Decision, supra, page 5.
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Tisdale is factually

distinguishable from the instant matter. In Tisdale, the record reflected that not only was the
community property divided between the parties, giving Mrs. Tisdale $140,000.00 in community
property, but Mr. Tisdale was Ordered to pay approximately $17,000.00 more of the community
debts than Mrs. Tisdale. The record also showed that Mrs. Tisdale had a college degree, had just
gotten an inheritance of approximately $87,000.000n the early 1990's) and monthly payments of
$300.00 a month from a promissory nOle, and had a pali-time job which paid approximately
$10,000.00 a year. It must also be remembered that the Supreme Court Decision in Stewart, supra,
was issued after Tisdale, included facts very similar to the matter currently before this Court, and
contained a finding that an award for a period of 12 ycars, until Mrs. Stewart reached retirement at
age 62, was not an award of maintenance "indefinitely." Stewart, supra at P.3d, page 551. Tisdale
is not cited in Stewart. And the Magistrate below specifically found that Bertha needed to be
working and his award of maintenance takes that into account.

It is also instructive that the Supreme Court, in Gustaves, supra, specifically found that the
awarding of primary physical custody of the minor children 10 the Party who had not committed
adultery was not punitive in nature, but ref1ected the fact that such actions by a party affect the family
unit and can be taken into account by the trial court.
For the first time on appeal, the Plaintiff cites this Court to an old case, Phillips v Phillips,
93 Idaho 384,462 P.2d 49 (1969) to support his position. Not only is that case way, way, prior to

Stewart, supra, but it was prior to Reed v Reed, 93 Idaho 511 ,465 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1970), reversed
on Constitutional grounds: Reedv Reed, 404 U.S. 71,92 S.C1. 251,30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), wherein
the Idaho Supreme Court had held that a probate statute which gave preference to men over women
was Constitutional. Phillips, supra, on its face, is distinguishable. First, the case involved a
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Modification proceeding, not an original divorce proceeding. Second, in the original divorce
proceeding, the parties stipulated to a divorce, which included maintenance payments to the wife,
and it was entered by default. Third, the issue in Phillips, supra, was whether there had been a
change in circumstances. There, the Court noted that the husband's income had been cut in half
since the Decree was entered and the wife's income had gone up substantially. Phillips is thus
inapplicable to the case at hand. But the language from Phillips cited by the Plaintiff on page 32 of
his Brief on Appeal about a "millstone" and "vengcf1.11 ex-wife" does seem to capture the Plaintiff's
overall demeanor towards Bertha, both at trial and thereafter. In fact, since Phillips really is not
applicable, about the only reason to cite it is to make sure and get that language before the Court.
The Plaintiff, again for the first time, also cites Robinson, supra, in support of his position.
Again, said case is prior to Stewart and, again, it is not exactly clear why the Plaintiff is citing this
case since it is not really applicable or is, at the very least, distinguishable. In that case, although the
husband admitted he had an affair, the Court docs not indicate whether the matter was actually
litigated on adultery(the wife had also fjled on the grounds of irreconcilable differences), the wife
was a college educated teacher, the wife was awarded a larger share of the community assets and the
husband was awarded a larger share of the community debts. None ofthat is present in the current
case, particularly since the Decision of the District below awarding half of the property in Mexico
to the Plaintiff. The Magistrate below, who heard all the evidence and was able to view the parties,

made the determination that Bertha would need assistance until she reached retirement age. That
is supported by the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeaL
Plaintiff has evidently filed a Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal with an Affidavit
of the Plaintiff dated June 28, 2012 and filed stamped June 29, 2012. Said Affidavit is improper
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since neither the Magistrate or the District Judge had an opportunity to review the information
contained therein and the proper standard for review in this Court is whether the Decision of the
Magistrate below is supported by the record at the time the Decision was entered. Nelson v Nelson,
144 Idaho 710,170 P.3d 375 (Idaho 2007).

ISSUE II:

THE AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT IS SUPPORTED BYTHEEVIDENCE AND
THE LAW.

The Plaintiff next contends that the award of Child Support was inappropriate because the
Court improperly computed the Plaintiff's income for child support purposes. I I
As to income for child support purposes, it must be remembered that, under Idaho Child
Support Guidelines 6(c)(6), Idaho Child Support Guidelines 6(a)(1)(ii):
"Compensation received by a party for employment in excess of a 40 hour week shall be
excluded from gross income, provided the party demonstrates and thc Court tinds: (1) the
excess employment is voluntary and not a condition of employment; and (2) the excess
employment is in the nature of additional, part-time employment, or is employment
compensable as overtime pay by the hour or fractions of the hour, and (3) the party's
compensation structure has not been changed for the purpose of affecting a support or
maintenance obligation, and (4) the party is otherwise paid for full time employment at least
48 weeks per year, and (5) child support payments are calculated based upon current income.
This provision is intended to benefit those who already work a full-time job, and undertake
voluntary, additional employment. It is not intended to benefit self-employed individuals who
may work more than 40 hours per week, those that may be seasonally employed in more than
one job (none of which is full-time), those who may be employed in excess of 40 hours per
week for part of the year, but are not employed full-time for most of the year, nor those
whose employerregularly requires overtime as part of their employment. "(Emphasis added).

liThe Plaintiff had also claimed below that he should be given credit for payments made
on the house and utilities during the divorce proceedings, he has evidently abandoned that issue
on Appeal to this Court, so it will not be addressed here.
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The emphasized language specifically provides that the Plaintiffhas the burden ofproving each and
every element set forth in the subsection ifhe does not want the Court to use his actual income. The
tax returns in this case and the Plaintiffs own testimony demonstrate that he consistently makes
approximately $50,000.00 a year or more. The testimony was conflicting as to whether he had to
work the long hours during planting and/or harvest. The Magistrate, in his discretion, determined
that the regular income for child support purposes should be around $49,000.00. This is supported
by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting evidence, and should not be disturbed on appeal.
In this, the evidence shows that, based on his testimony and his income over the years, the Plaintiff
did not take time off during those periods or refuse to work during them. He should have brought
in his direct supervisor to testify about whether that extra time was required or not. He failed to do
so. And even if he had, it would fail to overcome the fact that his Income had remained fairly
consistent over the last three years and was nowhere near the approximately $38,000.00 he claims
should be all the Court considcrs for child support purposes.
In Noble v Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 894 P.2d 118 (1995) the Court noted that "income" as set
forth in Idaho Child Support Guidelines 6(a)(1)(i) "includes income from any source" and, in that
case, included income from a second job. While Idaho Child Support Guidelines 6(a)(1 )(ii) may
have an impact on this, it doesn't change the basic premise of the guidelines that "both parents
should share legal responsibility for supporting their child or children in proportion

to

their

Guidelines Income.' " Noble v Fisher, supra at Idaho 888. Thus, the Plaintiff should have a heavy
burden as to each and every element contained in subsection Idaho Child Support Guidelines
6(a)(1)(ii) and the Magistrate below determined he had not met that burden.
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Although the evidence below showed that the Plaintiff consistently made around $49,000.00
a year, he claims only $37,914.00 should be used for child support purposes under Idaho Child
Support Guidelines 6(a)(1 )(ii) because approximately $]1,000.00, or 22 percent of his income is
"over time" pay which should not be counted. Under the above Section, the Plaintiff carries the
burden of proving all 5 elements necessary for the approximately $11,000.00 of his income to be
classified as "over time" and not used for child support purposes. The purpose of allowing the
exception for over time pay is to allow people to support their current families and get ahead on their
debts. The Plaintiff has not testified that he cannot support himself on his "regular" payor that it
is not sufficient to pay all of his bills and support himself. Indeed, the testimony in this case is that
the parties have no debt, other than regular monthly expenses and the debt on the Airport Road
Property, which is to be sold and the debt satisfied. Thus, his "over-time" pay is not necessary in
order to get ahead or get out of debt. It is regular income which should be used to benefit his child.

ISSUEIII:

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
THE LAW.

The Plaintiff next contends that the Magistrate erred in awarding some attorney fees to Bertha
because, the Plaintiff claims, income disparity is not a valid reason for such an award and the
Magistrate failed to make specific finds as to the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 32-704(3) and
§ 32-705 or that the factors in §32-705 have been properly considered. The Plaintiff is incorrect on
both counts and since they are closely related, they will be discussed together.
First, the Plaintiff contends that Jensen v Jensen, 128 Idaho 600,917 P.2d 757(1996), cited
by the Magistrate Court in its Memorandum Decision does not support the Magistrate's decision.
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While the Court in Jensen did uphold the denial of attorney fees by the Magistrate Court, in doing
so it noted that:
"Carla asserted that the magistrate failed to consider the disparity of Carla's income in comparison
to Stephen's income, in determining whether attorney fees were appropriate, citing to the holding in
Pieper v Pieper, 125 Idaho 667, 873 P.2d 921 (Ct.App.1994).
In Pieper, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a disparity in income was sufficient to support
a magistrate's conclusion that the party with the higher income should pay a share of the other party's
attorney fees under I.e. Section 32-704. ld. at 671, 873 P .2d at 925. However, in Ireland the Court
stated that, H[s]uch an award is not appropriate where a party has the financial resources necessary
to prosecute or defend the action." Ireland, 123 Idaho at 960, 855 P.2d at 45 (quoting Golder v
Golder, 110 Idaho 57,61-62,714 P2d 26, 30-31 (J986)); see also Balderson v Balderson, 127 Idaho
48, 54, 896 P.2d 956, 962 (1995) ("In considering Sherry's financial resources, this Court holds that
she has sufficient financial resources and declines to enter an order requiring Gerald to pay Sherry's
fees.").
The magistrate denied attorney fees stating: "In analyzing the request for attorney's fees, the
[magistrate] has reviewed those factors set forth in I.e. Sections 32-704, 32-705 and finds that each
party has sufficient property and employmentto provide for his or her reasonable needs and therefore
each party will be responsible for their respective attorney's fees." Idaho Code Section 32-704(3)
states that:
The court may from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties and the
factors set forth in section 32-705, Idaho Code, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost
to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this act and for attorney's fees ....
I.C. Section 32-704(3). In Noble we held that in order for an appellate court to uphold a lower court's
award of attorney fees pursuant to I.e. Section 32-704, the lower court must have considered and
cited factors listed in I.e. Section 32-705 in its decision. Noble, 126 Idaho at 891,894 P.2d at 124;
Smith v Smith, 124 Idaho 431,442,860 P.2d 634, 645 (1993).
The magistrate's decision in the present case stated that it had reviewed the factors set forth
in I.e. Sections 32-704 and 32-705, and found that each party had sufficient property and
employment to provide for his or her reasonable needs. The record indicates that Carla had an
income of at least $79,000 in 1994 and was going to continue in future years to be making at least
$55,000 a year and receive $834.25 in child support every month from Stephen. In addition, Stephen
was ordered to pay for all ofthe children's travel expenses to and from Idaho, Jordan's violin lessons,
and 71 % of the children's orthodontic expenses. The magistrate did not abuse its discretion in
denying Carla attorney fees pursuant to I.e. Section 32-704."
In the instant case, the Magistrate, both in his Memorandum Decision and on the Record in
the Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider, stated that he had considered the factors in Idaho Code §32-704
and §32-705, albeit in terms of both attorney fees and maintenance. Regardless of where it is in his
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Decision or in his discussion, the Magistrate clearly found that Bertha did not have the means to
provide for her reasonable needs, even taking into account the property obtained in the divorce (if
she ever gets any of it), even considering child sup port( which is interesting that the Plaintiff claims
this, since it is for the child, not Bertha), and even considering the maintenance awarded. Thus, since

Jensen, supra, upheld the finding of the Magistrate below, it is actually authority which supports the
Defendant, not the Plaintiff. There, as here, the ruling of the Magistrate is supported by the evidence
and should not be disturbed on appeal. The Plaintiff is no longer paying any child support. He can
afford to pay the attorney fees Ordered.

ISSUE IV:

THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES_ON APPEAL

The sole grounds' claimed by the Plaintiff for the award of attorney fees on appeal is Idaho
Code § J2-121, which requires the matter to be brought or defended frivolously and in an
unreasonable manner. Yet the Plaintiff claims it is the Magistrate that made grievous errors. He has
not demonstrated that Bertha has pursued this matter in anything but good faith. He sights no
authority other than the code section, makes no argument other than quoting the language of the code
section, and points to nothing specific in the record showing Bertha's actions to be frivolous or
unreasonable.

ISSUE V:

BERTHA SHOULD BE A WARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

On the other hand, there are several good grounds and reasons why this Court should award
attorney fees to Bertha on appeal. First, as the extensive analysis above shows, the Plaintiff has
brought this matter frivolously and unreasonably under Idaho Code § 12-121. The Court needs to
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look and the totality of the Defense or Prosecution in determining whether to award fees thereunder.
Magic Valley Radi%gyAssoc., P.A. v Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558,808 P.2d

1303 (1991). Here, the Plaintiff didn't like the decision of the Magistrate, so he has appealed. He
didn't like the Decision of the District Judge, so he has appealed again. The Defendant didn't like
the Decision ofthe District Court, but she didn't appeal. He has ignored the rulings and findings of
the Magistrate, probably because he just cannot imagine that he has any sort of duty to his wife of
26 years. He has dropped several of his arguments that he raised in the District Court below.
Second, again based on the extensive analysis above and the finding of the Magistrate and
District Courts below, all the terms and conditions under Idaho Code §32-704 and §32-705 have
been met, to wit:

I.e. §32-704(3). "The court may from time to time after considering the financial resources
of both parties and the factors set forth in section 32-705, Idaho Code, order a party to pay a
reasonable amount for the eost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under
this act and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior
to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment. The court may order that the
amOlmt be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name."
In the cases where the Appellate Court has not awarded fees, as in Jensen, supra at Idaho p.
606, the Court made a finding that the party requesting fees could, in fact, afford 10 pay their own
fees. For instance, the Court relied on the fact that Mrs. Jensen made

"at least $79,000 in 1994 and was going to continue in future years to be making at least $55,000 a
year and receive $834.25 in child support every month from Stephen. In addition Stephen was
ordered to pay for all ofthe children's travel expenses to and from Idaho, Jordan's violin lessons, and
71 % of the children's orthodontic expenses."
By contrast, Bertha is unemployed but could be making, at absolute most, about $17,000.00 a year.
She is no longer receiving any child support. She is receiving $800.00 a month in maintenance,
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although she has not received all of her payments. The Magistrate correctly found that she could
not provide for her reasonable needs, much less pay for attorney fees. Bertha showed, and the record
reflects, that she also cannot afford the costs of detending yet another appeal.

The Statute

specifically applies to "any proceeding under this act" and to "services rendered and costs
incurred[ .... ] after entry ofjudgmenL" This Court should award her attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

The Memorandum Decision and the Record below both support the rulings and findings of
the Magistrate. This Court should affirm the Magistrate's Decision and Decree, as modified by the
District Court, in all respects and award Bertha attorney fees on appeaL
If, for some reason, this Court does not agree with a specific portion or ruling of the
Magistrate, then it should remand the entire matter for the Magistrate to consider in light of this
Court's ruling on that issue since the Magistrate made clear, several times, that he considered all of
these issues together and ruled on them in the aggregate. Just one of the places he indicated this was
when he stated, during the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider: "So you're, you're right. It's, it's kind
of interrelated for me, kind of a general fairness looking at the, overall picture." Tr. p. 467, LL. 1-3.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26 h day of July, 2012.

ott~

Attorney for the Respondent, Bertha Pelayo
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26 th day of July, 2012, I mailed, hand delivered, or faxed, as
indicated below, true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following:
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Delivered
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Courthouse Box
Fax (208) 334-2942

Jonathan W. Harris
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